The aim of this paper is to examine whether or not financial liberalization has triggered banking crises in developing countries. We focus in particular on the role of capital inflows as their volatilities threat economic stability. In the empirical model, based on Panel Logit estimation, we use the two common financial liberalization indicators (de facto and dejure) for a panel of 58 developing countries for the period from 1984 to 2007. Unlike the previous studies, this paper reveals that both indicators of financial liberalization did not trigger banking crises in our sample.
Introduction
Financial liberalization is defined as the implementation of a set of measures aimed at eliminating the different restrictions and repression on the financial sector of a country that could hinder the well-functioning of its economy. According to and , the main source of repression is indubitably the intervention of the government in the monetary sphere to set interest rate and to fix the different tools of monetary policy. The authors viewed the liberalization -of interest rates and capital account-as an efficient solution to eliminate directed credits and to remove control of interest rate and high reserve requirements. They consider the external financial liberalization as an important economic policy tool that enhances economic growth. McKinnon and Shaw consider financial liberalization as a mainstay of economic reforms in developing countries . They called these countries to participate to the global financial integration to benefit the advantages of interconnected financial systems and to promote their banking and financial sector.
In the late eighties, financial liberalization became a strategy suggested by the International monetary fund under a framework called "Structural Adjustment Programs" (SAPs henceforth) to rescue fragile economies, notably those of developing countries (Hamdi et al. 2013) . This framework suggests the easing of portfolio restrictions on banks, changing in the ownership of banks, enhancing competition among banks, integrating of domestic entities to international markets, as well as changing in the monetary policy environment . As a result, numerous countries adopted the SAPs and have progressively liberalized their economies.
Literature on financial liberalization is rich and abundant. However, the empirical studies have produced mixed and conflicting results on the benefits of financial liberalization on the performance of the banking sector and/or economic growth. In fact, some authors , Prasard et al. 2003 , Mishkin 2005 showed that liberalization of capital flows can benefit both source and host countries by improving resource allocation, reducing financing costs, increasing competition and accelerating the development of domestic financial systems (IMF, 2012) . Rogoff (1999) showed that liberalization of capital flows enhances the level of free trade in financial claims; reduces the misallocation of resources and increases investment. Prasard et al. (2003) showed that opening up an economy to capital flows promotes domestic savings, reduces the cost of capital, and reduces the consumption volatility. Mishkin (2005) supports these arguments and add that liberalization stimulate the domestic financial sector development, which in turn promotes growth.
On the other hand, several studies showed the adverse impact of liberalization of capital flows (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, 2000; Mehrez and Kaufmann, 2000) . It was argued that liberalization is a principal threat to economic stability due to the volatility of capital flows. Stiglitz (2002) argued that financial openness leaves emerging market countries vulnerable to external crises, which have a severe negative effect on domestic economic performance.
According to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) , the accumulation of larger stocks of gross foreign assets and liabilities has increased the magnitude of fluctuations in the value of cross-border holdings.
Following the multiple crises of the nineties 2 , several studies were carried out to examine the possible link between financial liberalization and banking crises. For example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) showed that among the 26 cases of banking crises they found, 18 of them took place after five years from the liberalization of the financial market. Similarly, Kaminsky (2008) showed that a high level of financial integration increases the risk of sudden stop of capital flows, even in the absence of macroeconomic imbalances found in the host country. In another study, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) conducted a study to examine the determinants of banking crises for a large sample of countries over the period 1800-2008. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the methodology and data, section three presents the empirical results and section four concludes.
Methodology

Data and variables
In this study, we use a Panel of 58 developing countries for a time period from 1984-2007. The econometric estimation is based on Panel Logit regression approach as the dependent variable, which is the probability of occurrence of bank crisis (BC), is assumed to be a binary choice variable. With the use of Panel Logit regression we can see how changes in the different explanatory variables affect the probability of a bank crisis. Furthermore, the Logit model will help us in interpreting the regression coefficients more closely to the changes in the probability of bank crisis.
For data on bank crises episodes, it was drawn from the surveys of Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) which was recently updated by Caprio et al. (2005) and Laeven and Valencia (2008) . The set of explanatory variables will be the same as Demirgüç- BV is a vector of 3 variables that reflects some characteristics of a country's banking sector.
These variables are the ratio of broad money to the foreign exchange reserves of the central bank (M2/RES), which captures the vulnerability of the economy to sudden capital outflows triggered by a run on the currency (Büyükkarabacak and Valev 2008) . Greater M2 to reserves ratio is expected to raise the likelihood of banking crises. We use the ratio of bank credit to the private sector scaled by GDP (CPS/GDP) which is an indicator of financial development of a country.
We also use the growth of bank credit to the private sector (GC) which reflects the dynamic and evolution of lending activities in a country.
MV is a set of macroeconomic variables which includes real gross domestic product per capita (GDPpc) which has been negatively linked to banking crises (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 1997). We include the rate of real GDP growth (GDPGR) which captures macroeconomic developments that affect the quality of bank assets. This ratio is expected to minimize the effects of financial crises. We will use Inflation rate (Inf.) which is measured by percentage change in the consumer price index. Finally, there would be a variable to measure the degree of openness of the economy. This variable is defined as export plus import scaled by GDP (Op. All the variables of the model are lagged one year before the date of defacto financial liberalization to test the effect of the level of capital flows on the probability of occurrence of a banking crisis.
The Model
We specify a conditional Logit Panel model with individual specific effects where the dependent variable, BC = 1 if crisis occurs and 0 otherwise. The aim of this method is to identify the factors that determine the occurrence of a bank crisis by developing countries. The model is expressed as follows:
yit, * is a linear function that depends on a vector of explanatory variables.
With + is an error term that contains country and time specific fixed effects:
Where, the are assumed to be independent and identically distributed with mean zero and variance σ2
: Vector of all the explanatory variables (banking and macroeconomics)
: Variables of Financial liberalization.
Consequently, the probability that a country i experiences a banking crisis in the year t is as follows:
Where F is the partition function. The coefficient of economic growth, proxied by GDP growth (GDPGR), is negative and significant at 1% level of significance. This shows that banking crises get triggered when the economic performance of a country is weak. More rapid economic growth is associated with increasing incomes and a low probability of a banking crisis.
Results
Determinants of banking crises
The coefficient of inflation is positive and significant at a 5% level of significance. This indicates that a banking crisis is likely to occur in countries with a high inflation rate. The variable M2/reserves is negative but not significant while the domestic credit growth (CG) and private sector credit to GDP (CPS/GDP) are both positive and significant at the 1% level. This confirms the effect of rapid domestic credit growth on the probability of occurrence of banking crises. In equation 2, we added two variables that reflect the liberalization process. The first variable is openness (OP.) and the second one is defacto liberalization and both are lagged of one year. The results of the model are similar to the previous one but M2/reserves becomes positive and significant at 1% level of significance. This shows that, following the liberalization process, when the financial sector holds considerable foreign currency liabilities it becomes more exposed to a banking and financial crisis.
The coefficient of openness (Op.) is negative and significant at 10% level of significance. This indicates that openness to external financial systems could facilitate the transmission of crises and confirms the effect of macroeconomic shocks on the probability of occurrence of banking crises. Regarding defacto liberalization, it has a negative sign but is not significant.
Turing now to the third equation; we replaced defacto liberalization by its two components which are foreign assets to GDP and foreign liabilities to GDP. Despite this disaggregation, the result is identical to the model 2.
Defacto and Dejure liberalization and banking crisis
We use a new method to estimate how foreign direct investment could generate a banking crisis.
While Joyce (2011) and to give a better understanding of which ratio is the most likely to trigger a banking crisis.
Defacto liberalization and banking crisis
In the section above we followed the previous empirical studies and we proxied defacto
liberalization by an index of international financial integration (IFI). Empirical results show that
deafcto liberalization does not have any considerable role in triggering financial and banking crisis. By divided defacto into Liabilities/GDP and Assets/GDP ratios, we also found similar results. In this section we disaggregate these two measures by type of capital flows. Therefore, we will use the six ratios as explained above. The results are displayed in the table below. As we have six indicators, we will separately introduce each ratio along with the set of explanatory variables. Unlike Joyce (2011), we keep the openness variable (OP) as it was significant and positive in the equation 2 and 3 of table 1.
In the first equation, we introduced the debt to total foreign assets ratio (debt/Tot.A) and we found that it does not trigger a banking crisis in developing countries. We also found that the results of the explanatory variables remained unchanged except for M2/Reserves which became positive and significant at 5% level of significance. Again, this shows the problem of holding large foreign currency liabilities. This scenario is the main reason behind the Asian financial crisis of 1997 in which the currency depreciation ravaged the financial sector of the so called "Tigers countries". In equation 2 when we added foreign direct investment liabilities to total assets (FDIL/Tot. A.), we also found that this ratio does not trigger a crisis. However, inflation, credit growth and openness have become non-significant. Similar results were found while introducing foreign portfolio equity liabilities ratio (FPEL/Tot.A). In equation 4 when introducing debt to total foreign liabilities ratio we found that it could trigger a financial crisis and all the explanatory variables, except GDP per capita, are significant. This shows that crises could happen in countries with a large debt ratio. The recent experience of PIIGS 6 countries and
Cyprus are the best witness of problem related to high debt. Similar results were found in equation 5 with foreign direct investment liabilities to total foreign liabilities ratio but openness becomes insignificant. Finally, in equation 6, foreign portfolio equity liabilities to total liabilities ratio is positive but not significant which mean that it could not engender a crisis in these developing countries.
Dejure liberalization and banking crisis
In this section, we aim at measuring whether or not dejure liberalization triggers banking crises in the developing countries. To this end, we use only the dejure indicator and we introduce the different variables which are in liaison with the dejure liberalization. The results are displayed in the table 3. 6 Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. In the first equation, the dejure variable is negative and not significant. This shows that it does not trigger banking crises in the developing countries of our sample. On the other hand, all the explanatory variables, except GDP per capita, are significant.
In the second equation, we introduced foreign liabilities to GDP ratio but the results remained unchanged and dejure does not produce a crisis. Again, when introducing the size of the government, measured by the government final consumption expenditure as a share of GDP, we do not find any change. Finally, in the last equation, we added the public debt of the country as a share of GDP. It is well known that larger government budget deficits are expected to increase the probability of crises. In the estimation, we find that the public debt ratio is positive and significant a 10% level of significance and the signs of the other explanatory variables remain unchanged. It appears that when the budget deficit increases, developing countries are incapable to support the high costs of insolvent banks. Moreover, governments facing severe fiscal imbalances are more likely to use the financial sector as an off-budget source of funding for government objectives, by pressuring banks to direct loans to favored borrowers. According to Keefer (2001) , since securing repayment of loan obligations from these borrowers is typically a difficult proposition for banks, these pressures can translate into solvency difficulties for the financial system.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to examine the consequences of financial liberalization on the economic and financial stability of developing countries. Precisely, we tried to understand whether the adoption of financial liberalization is followed by banking crises or not. 
